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ICRA HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF:
A NEW HABEAS JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE
POST-OLIPHANT WORLD?
Hunter Cox*
INTRODUCTION
The Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013
(VAWA 2013) allows tribes to enforce criminal laws on their lands
against non-Indians by relaxing federal restrictions on tribal
jurisdiction through special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction
(SDVCJ).1 This SDVCJ reflects congressional reaffirmation of the
inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and is an
important step towards ensuring the safety of Native American
women within their own communities. This inherent sovereign
power of tribes to provide safety and security in their communities
through their own criminal laws was first questions by the
Supreme Court in 1978 after centuries of tribes carrying on
relations with non-Indians. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
the Supreme Court held that tribes did not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their own reservations because
“Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’” 2 The Court
concluded that, “by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their

*

Hunter Cox is a citizen of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation and a recent
graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and the Gerald R. Ford
School of Public Policy. He is a law clerk at Van Ness Feldman, LLP, and
former president of the non-profit National Native American Law Students
Association (NNALSA). He would like to thank Professor Matthew Fletcher for
his guidance and feedback on this article, all of the advocates fighting for the
safety of our tribal communities, and of course mom and dad for their love and
support. All opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and
do not reflect the views of Van Ness Feldman, LLP, or its clients.
1
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §1304 (2013)).
2
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).

597

2017]

ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief

598

power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a
manner acceptable to Congress.”3
VAWA 2013 establishes Congress’s explicit answer to
Oliphant, legislating its clear support of tribes’ inherent sovereign
power to prosecute non-Indians, and creating the first specific
exceptions to the Court’s rule against tribal prosecution of nonIndians. Although VAWA 2013 does not overturn Oliphant, it
narrows Oliphant’s applicability and has ushered in the postOliphant world where tribes may prosecute non-Indians as
sovereign entities.
Although VAWA represents an important development for
tribes and law and order on Indian reservations, tribal convictions
may be challenged by writ of habeas corpus in federal court;
therefore, the law will be as effective as the federal courts allow it
to be. Ultimately, the federal courts’ treatment of tribal convictions
on habeas review, as well as the tribal courts that produce them,
will determine the law’s success in stemming the violence against
women occurring throughout Indian country.
This article discusses several issues that arise from the
confluence of the tribal sovereignty doctrine, federal habeas
corpus, and the exhaustion doctrine under VAWA 2013. Because
the Constitution does not apply to tribes as it does to the states,4 the
legal structure of VAWA 2013 raises novel constitutional concerns
within Indian law jurisprudence. As more tribes implement
VAWA 2013, these new questions will likely be raised via habeas
corpus challenges under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). How
the Constitution will apply to criminal defendants in tribal courts,
or alternatively, how tribal courts will apply pseudo-constitutional
individual rights in criminal cases, is beyond the scope of this
article. However, this article addresses how federal courts will
interpret and decide the federal habeas corpus rules and the
processes that courts will use to ultimately decide those substantive
questions of constitutional rights and the tribal sovereignty
doctrine.
Part I describes the background and legislative history of
VAWA 2013, highlighting the debate in Congress between
permitting tribes to exercise their inherent sovereign jurisdiction
3
4

Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1898).
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and delegating federal jurisdiction to the tribes. 5 Congress’s
decision to maintain inherent sovereignty reaffirms the Doctrine of
Tribal Sovereignty and ultimately will lead to more effective and
fair tribal laws. Part II describes the writ of habeas corpus in more
detail and discusses the complex legal questions arising from
Congress’s decision to reaffirm inherent tribal authority in VAWA
2013. Both habeas corpus and tribal sovereignty jurisprudence
have strong exhaustion doctrines based in the orderly management
of justice and respect for other sovereigns in the federalist system.
VAWA 2013’s immediate habeas review for SDVCJ convictions
and stay of detention remedies run contrary to these principles.
Part III analyzes the clear language of ICRA, as amended by
VAWA 2013, which establishes unique habeas corpus remedies
but does not clearly establish the procedural rules and standards for
granting habeas relief. In applying the “substantial likelihood”
standard, which is the standard that an SDVCJ habeas petitioner
must satisfy to be granted immediate relief under VAWA 2013, the
federal courts must rely on the current binding tribal exhaustion
doctrine established in National Farmers and its progeny. Thus,
this article concludes that Congress has created new federal habeas
remedies in VAWA 2013 that must be interpreted through the
Supreme Court’s long-standing precedents on tribal exhaustion
requirements.
Ultimately, as tribal governments continue developing and as
more tribal legislatures pass criminal codes under SDVCJ,
questions about the delicate coexistence of, and interaction
between, tribal and American sovereignty will arise in ICRA
habeas corpus litigation. In resolving these complex questions,
federal courts should refrain from judicial activist tendencies as
seen under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Interpretations of
VAWA 2013’s unprecedented, immediate federal habeas corpus
relief and the application of habeas corpus precedent in the ICRA
context more generally should be based upon federal Indian law,
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, and the very real policy impacts
5

This distinction has important appellate ramifications. Delegated authority
would simply federalize any tribal SDVCJ convictions, with tribal prosecutors
essentially acting as deputized federal prosecutors. The resulting convictions
would be reviewable in federal courts on direct appeal. Inherent authority
maintains the three distinct sovereigns in the federalist system, with tribes
prosecuting crimes under their own authority and purview similar to state
prosecutions, but with federal government review on habeas.
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of tribal sovereign prosecutions of domestic violence in securing
safe communities for Native Americans. Indian country should
share in the overall safety benefits that the rest of the country has
enjoyed since the initial passage of VAWA in 1993.
I.Brief Introduction to Habeas Corpus and VAWA 2013
Originally only available for federal convictions, the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 expanded federal habeas corpus review in
order to protect civil rights in the South in the wake of the Civil
War. 6 Congress and the federal courts have significantly limited
access to habeas corpus review in recent years. Habeas corpus has
become a pipe dream for state and federal prisoners given that only
0.35% of habeas petitions filed are granted habeas relief. 7 Yet for
federal collateral attacks on tribal convictions, Congress has
greatly expanded federal habeas review powers in VAWA 2013,
but only for tribal prosecutions of non-Indians under inherent tribal
authority. 8 The Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe that tribes are prohibited from exercising their
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 9 VAWA 2013
establishes three exceptions to the Oliphant rule, for domestic
violence, dating violence, and restraining order violations.10
In contrast to what has been called the “incredible shrinking
writ” for federal review of state convictions, 11 VAWA 2013
significantly expanded federal habeas corpus review of tribal
convictions. 12 The VAWA 2013 amendments did not extend the
6

Judiciary Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385-86, reprinted in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441-45 (1963) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(1996)). Federal habeas corpus act codified at 28 U.S.C. §§2241-2254.
7
Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2009).
8
See Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2013)). VAWA 2013 amends the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which provides “the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to
test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.” Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
9
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribes
do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders).
10
25 U.S.C. §1304(c) (2013).
11
Jeanne-Marie Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 9 CAP. DEF
J. 52, 52 (1996).
12
25 U.S.C. §1304(c) (2013).

601

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:308

habeas procedural barriers to federal review of state convictions to
Section 1304(e) SDVCJ habeas review. Instead, Congress created
completely unique tribal habeas corpus remedies for immediate
federal habeas review and the completely unprecedented remedy of
a federal stay of detention of convicted offenders.13 Under VAWA
2013, the federal habeas court is not even required to decide the
habeas petition on the merits before ordering a stay of detention,
but merely must find a “substantial likelihood” the petitioner
would be granted habeas relief.14
These SDVCJ habeas remedies far exceed the federal authority
on habeas review of state convictions as amended in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”). 15 AEDPA codifies recent Supreme Court precedent
limiting state petitioner access to federal habeas review by
increasing procedural requirements. VAWA 2013’s unprecedented
federal invasion of tribal court jurisdiction demeans tribal
sovereignty, creates uncertainty about the ICRA habeas
jurisprudence, and chills the effective implementation of tribal
SDVCJ. Although Congress reaffirmed inherent tribal sovereignty
over non-Indians for SDVCJ,16 permitting federal habeas review
without requiring petitioners to exhaust tribal remedies undermines
both tribal sovereignty and habeas exhaustion jurisprudence. No
such deference is given to tribes under VAWA 2013. VAWA
2013’s unprecedented habeas remedies of contradict those
principles.
VAWA 2013 marks the first time that tribes may prosecute
non-Indian criminals in their own communities since the Court’s
1978 Oliphant decision to limit tribal jurisdiction.17 In writing the
opinion of the Court, Justice Rehnquist applied “racist nineteenthcentury beliefs and stereotypes … [of] Indian tribes, as lawless and
uncivilized savage peoples.”18 The Court supported its abrogation
of tribal criminal jurisdiction with “unsupported conclusions
tainted by judicial activism,” and cited dubious precedential
13

25 U.S.C. §1304(e)(2) (2013).
25 U.S.C. §1304(e) (2013).
15
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §2254 et seq.).
16
25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(1) (2013).
17
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191.
18
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT,
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA, 98 (2005).
14
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authority for its holding.19 The Court found that “[c]ongress never
expressly forbade Indian tribes [from] impos[ing] criminal
penalties on non-Indians,” thus “impl[ying] … that Congress
consistently believed” Indian tribes did not have jurisdiction over
non-Indians. 20 This holding overlooked the fact that Congress
never legislated the matter and completely contradicted the
longstanding Indian cannons of construction, which dictate that
ambiguities are to be held in favor of the tribes. 21 The Oliphant
decision was based more on the biases, stereotypes, and incorrect
“historical perspective”22 of the Justices rather than equitable legal
and historical analysis.23 The Supreme Court reinforced the weak
reasoning of the Oliphant decision two weeks later in U.S. v
Wheeler by inventing the idea that Congress may “implicitly
divest[]” tribes of their inherent powers in addition to explicit
abrogation by statute or treaty.24
Although not the full legislative reversal of Oliphant that tribes
have long advocated for, 25 VAWA 2013 is a significant step
towards federal acknowledgment of full tribal criminal jurisdiction
over Indian lands. As of March of 2015 at the close of the SDVCJ
pilot project, 26 five SDVCJ pilot programs in Pascua Yaqui,
Umatilla, Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate, Fort Peck and the Tulalip
Tribe of Washington have successfully resulted in 28
19

Geoffrey C. Heisey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over NonIndians: Asserting Congress’s Plenary Power to Restore Territorial
Jurisdiction, 73 Indian L. J. 1051, 1062, 1051 n.3 (1998). (There is a long
literature of Indian law scholars criticizing the Oliphant decision).
20
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201.
21
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (McLean J., concurring).
22
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
23
See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal
Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010); R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE
MAN’S INDIAN (Vintage ed. 1979); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY, 43 (1987) (describing the Court’s rationale in Oliphant as a
"visceral reaction" to tribes rather than legal reasoning of legal precedent and
Congress’s policy of Indian self-determination).
24
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (“The areas in which such
implicit divestiture of sovereignty have been held to have occurred are those
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe”).
25
National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”), Combating Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault: A Call for a Full Oliphant Fix, Resolution #SPO16-037 (July 30, 2016) (available at
http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/combatting-non-indian-domesticviolence-and-sexual-assault-a-call-for-a-full-oliphant-fixf).
26
VAWA Sec. 908(a).
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convictions. 27 Currently, any tribe may implement SDVCJ
jurisdiction over non-Indians for a limited scope of domestic
violence and related crimes committed in Indian country.28
Congressional debate over VAWA 2013 highlighted the
concern that tribal courts will not provide due process and other
protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution to non-Indian
defendants. 29 Noting that tribes are not subject to the U.S.
Constitution, 30 VAWA 2013 opponents argued that American
citizens will be tried in tribal courts without the benefit of
fundamental criminal procedure rights guaranteed in the U.S.
Constitution. 31 For example, Senator Chuck Grassley told an
audience “on an Indian reservation, [the jury is] going to be made
up of Indians, right? So the non-Indian doesn’t get a fair trial,”32
implying that Native Americans are unable to act as impartial
jurors. Senator Grassley and other opponents of VAWA 2013 have
not raised the same concerns for Indian defendants in state and
federal courts tried by completely non-Indian juries.
A.

Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

However, as sovereign “domestic dependent nations,”33 tribes
have their own inherent authority to create and enforce their own
27

Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
§904(b)(2), 127 Stat. 121 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 1304); NAT’L CONG. OF
AMERICAN INDIANS, SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
PILOT PROJECT REPORT, 8-13 (October 29, 2015).
28
VAWA Sec. 908(a).
29
Whether congressional representatives may have similar concerns about tribal
court treatment of Indians is irrelevant given that tribes already have criminal
jurisdiction over them.
30
Talton, 163 U.S. 376.
31
Although tribes are not constrained by the U.S. Constitution, all Native
Americans have been citizens since 1924, when Congress passed the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253, and are no less
understanding of its protections than American citizens who are not Indians.
32
Jennifer Benderly, Chuck Grassley On VAWA: Tribal Provision Means ‘The
Non-Indian Doesn’t Get A Fair Trial,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/chuck-grassleyvawa_n_2735080.html; See also Kate Pickert, What’s Wrong With The Violence
Against Women Act?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://nation.time.com/2013/02/27/whats-wrong-with-the-violence-againstwomen-act/ (noting Republican opposition to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
because of Constitutional concerns); Ryan Devreskracht, House Republicans
Add Insult To Native Women’s Injury, 3 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1,
1-4 (2014).
33
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
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laws independent of the U.S. Constitution and Congress. 34
Although the Supreme Court judicially restrained tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indian criminal defendants in Oliphant under U.S. v.
Wheeler’s theory of “implicit divestiture,” 35 Congress can act
explicitly to correct the court’s errors. For example, Congress
passed the “Duro-Fix” 36 to “change ‘judicially made’ federal
Indian law through … legislation” 37 after the Supreme Court
further constrained tribal criminal jurisdiction to only tribal
members in Duro v. Reina. 38 Ultimately, Congress has “plenary
power” in Indian affairs,39 such that tribal sovereignty “exists only
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete
defeasance.” 40 Thus, Congress may also “enact[] a new statute,
relaxing restrictions on the bounds of the inherent tribal authority
that the United States recognizes.”41
Congress has recently increased efforts to improve safety in
Indian country through passing VAWA 2013 and the Tribal Law
and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), which expanded tribal sentencing
authority.42 VAWA 2013 SDVCJ will improve the safety of Native
American women by permitting tribal prosecution of domestic
violence crimes. 43 Specifically, this partial Oliphant-fix
“affirm[s]… the powers of self-government of a participating tribe
[to] include the inherent power of that tribe … to exercise special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons.” 44 This
includes non-Indian defendants that reside or are employed in

34

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
36
Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, §8077(d), 104 Stat.
1893 (temporary legislation until September 30, 1991); Act of Oct. 28, 1991,
105 Stat. 646 (permanent legislation) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 25 U.S.C.); See generally Geoffrey C. Heisey, Oliphant and Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: Asserting Congress’s Plenary Power to Restore
Territorial Jurisdiction, 73 INDIAN L. J. 1051, 1071-75 (1998).
37
U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004).
38
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
39
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
40
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
41
Lara, 541 U.S. at 207.
42
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat.
2261 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
43
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §1304 (2013)).
44
25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(1) (2013).
35
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Indian country of the participating tribe,45 or are a spouse, intimate
partner, or dating partner of a tribal member or nonmember Indian
residing in the Indian country of the participating tribe.46 VAWA
2013 gives subject matter jurisdiction to the participating tribe over
domestic violence, dating violence, and violations of tribe-issued
protection orders.47
Congress pass TLOA in 2010 to increase tribal law
enforcement presence in Indian country by providing grants,
increased cross-deputization opportunities with state and federal
agencies, and increasing tribal sentencing authority. Under TLOA,
tribes imposing an “enhanced sentence” of at least one year must
provide the defendant with “effective assistance of counsel at least
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,”
including indigent defense. 48 Additionally, TLOA establishes
judicial standards and prior notice by publication of the laws as
requirements to impose enhanced sentences. 49 Various tribal
enhanced jurisdiction and sentencing authorities have been
recently recognized in several different acts passed by Congress.
The TLOA recognizes tribal sentences greater than one year if the
defendant is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel equal to the
Sixth Amendment, 50 indigent assistance by a licensed defense
attorney, 51 public notice of all laws prior to charging the
defendant,52 and creation of a trial record.53 Additionally, the judge
presiding over the criminal proceeding must have “sufficient legal
training to preside over criminal proceedings,” and be licensed to
practice law in any U.S. jurisdiction.54 Tribes exercising SDVCJ
and fulfilling TLOA requirements may sentence defendants up to
three years per separate offense that would be “punishable by more
45

25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(4)(B)(i, ii) (2013).
25 U.S.C. §1304(b)(4)(B)(iii) (2013).
47
25 U.S.C. §1304(c)(2013).
48
25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1-2) (2013) (It is unclear why TLOA mandates tribal
provision of counsel for indigent defendants in § 1302(c)(2), when such a right
is already ensured through the constitutionally-equivalent requirement in §
1302(c)(1); this language makes it unclear whether TLOA’s effective assistance
of counsel right is coextensive with Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel).
49
25 U.S.C. §1302(c)(3-4) (2012).
50
25 U.S.C. §1302(c)(1) (2012).
51
Id. at §1302(c)(2).
52
Id. at §1302(c)(4).
53
Id. at §1302(c)(5).
54
Id. at §1302(c)(3).
46
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than one year of imprisonment if prosecuted by the United States
or any of the States.”55 The total sentence a tribe can impose with
consecutive sentences is nine years.56
In VAWA 2013, Congress used similar constitutional
equivalence language in requiring that all SDVCJ defendants must
receive “all other rights whose protection is necessary under the
Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to
recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 57 Although
there is some debate about the constitutionality of VAWA 2013
because the Act creates statutory rather than Constitutional rights,
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) guarantees similar substantive
rights as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.58 This includes “the
right to a trial by an impartial jury that is drawn from sources that –
(A) reflect a fair cross section of the community; and (B) do not
systematically exclude any distinctive group in the community,
including non-Indians.”59 The “fair cross section” language tracks
the “constitutional imperative of race neutrality in jury selection”60
that “juries as instruments of public justice…be a body truly
representative of the community.”61 In Glasser v. U.S., the Court
grounded this fair “cross section” requirement in the Sixth
Amendment,62 which may be applicable to tribal convictions with
enhanced sentences under TLOA.63
The VAWA 2013 amendments depart significantly from the
analogous state habeas statutes, which focus on respecting the
sovereignty of states and their judicial processes. 64 Instead of
55

Id. at §1302(b)(2).
Id. at §1302(a)(7)(d).
57
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2013).
58
See generally JANE M. SMITH & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42488, TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS IN THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) REAUTHORIZATION AND SAVE
NATIVE WOMEN ACT (2012); Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An Argument For A Statutory
Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009).
59
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3)(A-B) (2013).
60
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
61
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
62
Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
63
See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing The ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement,
13 J. OF CONST. L. 932-33 (2011) (Tribes may apply different standards, as
critics have lamented the fair cross section standard as “stagnant” and
insufficient constitutional protections).
64
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2011).
56
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commanding exhaustion of tribal remedies just as state court
remedies must be exhausted, VAWA 2013 mandates that federal
courts “shall grant a stay [of detention]” to SDVCJ §1303 habeas
petitioners “if the court finds that there is a substantial likelihood
that the habeas corpus petition will be granted.” 65 To grant the
stay, the reviewing court must also find “by clear and convincing
evidence that under conditions imposed by the court, the petitioner
is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any person or the
community if released.”66 The Act also gives “each alleged victim
in the matter an opportunity to be heard” before the court rules on
the petitioner’s stay of detention.67 This language is similar to the
federal criminal direct appeal procedural rules for post-conviction
challenges. 68 Adopting this language would have provided
defendants with federal criminal procedure remedies like removal
and direct appeals rather than habeas review. Ultimately, Congress
reaffirmed inherent tribal jurisdiction rather than delegating
constitutional authority from the federal government to tribes for
SDVCJ prosecutions.
VAWA 2013 contains a catchall provision including “all other
rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the
United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the
inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise SDVCJ over
the defendant.” 69 This language gives way to two possible
interpretations. 70 First, if Congress intends for “recognize and
affirm” to mean that only the requirements already outlined in
ICRA 71 are required for affirmation of SDVCJ convictions, then
some constitutional protections incorporated against the states
would be excluded. This interpretation would “exclude several
protections accorded under the United States Constitution as
applied against the states, including a jury of one’s peers and the
right to counsel in misdemeanor cases where the defendant faces
actual punishment.”72

65

25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(A) (2013) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 1304(e)(2)(B).
67
Id.
68
18 U.S.C. § 3245.
69
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (2017).
70
SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 58.
71
See generally 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1304.
72
See SMITH & THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 4.
66
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Alternatively, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary applied a
different interpretation and viewed the provision as “protect[ing]
effectively the same constitutional rights as guaranteed in State
court criminal proceedings.”73 The United States’ Constitution did
not originally apply to the states, 74 and the Supreme Court
eventually applied the Bill of Rights by selective incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Rights that are “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty”76 or necessary for the “fundamental
fairness essential to the very concept of justice” 77 have been
incorporated against the states. However, under Talton v. Mayes
these constitutional rights do not apply to tribes, and ICRA
provides the only federal individual rights which constrain tribal
governments.78 Ultimately, ICRA’s provisions guarantee both the
right to an impartial jury under Section 1304(d)(3) and the right to
counsel under Section 1302(c) in SDVCJ prosecutions.79Although
this language ensures that SDVCJ defendants will be afforded
those constitutional equivalent rights, the language does not
resolve the ambiguity of the phrase “recognize and affirm.”80
Courts can resolve this ambiguity by developing the individual
rights requirements of ICRA Section 1304(d) as a statutory vehicle
for selective incorporation of tribal criminal law into the federal
constitutional system.81 Although some scholars have argued “only
73

S. REP. 112-153, at 10 (2012).
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
75
E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on
admitting evidence obtained through unlawful searches and seizures applies to
state as well as federal governments); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (state courts are required to provide counsel in criminal cases under the
Sixth Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
77
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 235 (1941).
78
Talton, 163 U.S. 376.
79
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (2013).
80
25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4) (“All other rights whose protection is necessary under
the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and
affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise [SDVCJ].”).
81
Some scholars argue that tribes have been incorporated into the federal system
already. See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The
Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism
and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 617, 631 (1994); Carol
Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional Status of
Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318 (2003). However, other scholars argue
tribes remain unincorporated. See generally Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court,
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1, 21-46 (1987); Alex T.
Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of
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a constitutional amendment can truly guarantee…tribal
sovereignty,” 82 Congress’s plenary authority in Indian affairs
means that legislation is sufficient to protect tribal sovereignty and
avoid the complexities of the constitutional amendment process.83
The VAWA 2013 framework preserves inherent tribal sovereignty
by creating exceptions to the Oliphant rule, rather than converting
inherent tribal sovereignty into constitutional authority and
necessarily making tribal sovereignty a power delegated from the
Constitution. In this way, Congress has struck a delicate balance
between protecting tribal legal and cultural norms84 and ensuring
constitutionally sufficient tribal prosecutions through federal
habeas review.85
B.

Legislative History of VAWA 2013

President Obama signed VAWA 2013 into law because “tribal
governments have an inherent right to protect their people, and all
women … including Native American women left vulnerable by
gaps in the law … deserve the right to live free from fear.”86 Many
years of tribal activists’ efforts culminated in Title IX of the
VAWA 2005 reauthorization, which was passed for the purposes
of decreasing violence against Indian women, holding offenders
Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 49 (2004) (“No single act of Congress that
can be said to have officially ‘incorporated’ tribes within the political system of
the United States…If [incorporation] did occur, it can only have been done
incrementally as a result of a series of congressional legislation and court
decisions.”).
82
See Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional
Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 285
(2003).
83
Cf., id., at fn. 21.
84
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-9 (1978) (holding that ICRA
provides no federal court review for individual rights violations in the civil
context).
85
An amendment introduced by Republican Representative Darrell Issa, would
have created a right for “a defendant charged with a crime under this section [to]
petition the appropriate Federal district for removal pursuant to [18 U.S.C. §
3245].” See Violence Against Indian Women Act, H.R.6625, 112th Cong. § 2
Removal of Criminal Prosecutions (2012) (This amendment did not pass the
house, and S. 47 retained ICRA’s only federal relief through writ of habeas
corpus).
86
President Barack Obama, President Signs 2013 VAWA – Empowering Tribes
to Protect Native Women (March 7, 2013), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/03/07/president-signs-2013vawa-empowering-tribes-protect-native-women.
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accountable, and “strengthen[ing] the capacity of Indian tribes to
exercise their sovereign authority to respond to violent crimes
committed against Indian women.”87 Congress acknowledged that
“1 out of every 3 Indian women are raped in their lifetime” and
explicitly stated that the “United States … [has] a Federal trust
responsibility to assist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives
of Indian women,” and authorized funds for studies and grants for
tribal programs.88
In 2006, Amnesty International shined a spotlight on the
staggering disparity between rates of domestic and sexual violence
against Native American women when compared to the population
generally. 89 Amnesty focused on the jurisdictional and
governmental structure issues that exacerbated the rates of sexual
violence and predation experience in Indian country. 90 In 2009,
reported instances of rape nationwide were down 60% 91 and
murders of women by their abusive partners were down 72% since
the passage of VAWA in 1994. 92 Nation-wide, the incidence of
intimate partner violence fell by 67%, individuals killed by an
intimate partner declined by 35%, and non-fatal intimate partner
violence decreased by 53%.93 State reforms since 1994 resulted in
660 state laws to protect against domestic and sexual violence by
criminalizing stalking, date rape, and spousal rape.94 As the stigma
of domestic violence receded in the wake of VAWA, reporting of
domestic violence increased 51% nationwide since VAWA was
first passed in 1994.95
The benefits of VAWA did not occur in Indian country, where
the “jurisdictional gap created by Oliphant has had grave
87

Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162, §
902, 119 Stat. 2960 (codified with some differences in language at 42 U.S.C.
3796gg).
88
Id. at § 904, § 906.
89
Maze of Injustice: The Failure to Protect Indigenous Women from Sexual
Violence in the USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS (2007),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/mazeofinjustice.pdf (last visited Mar. 15,
2017).
90
Id. at 27-49, 61-71.
91
S. REP. NO. 112-265, at 2 (2012).
92
The Continued Importance of the Violence Against Women Act Before the
Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (remarks by Senator
Kaufman).
93
S. REP. NO. 112-265, 3 (2012).
94
Id.
95
Id.
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consequences for Indian women… [who] are left without any
recourse when the perpetrator is non-Indian.” 96 Although
nationwide there were improvements in reporting, only “49 percent
of Native women victimization is reported to the police, [and] only
17 percent is reported directly by the victim.” 97 Congress
ostensibly recognized the need for the jurisdictional authority of
tribes to protect their communities as the only solution to address
violence on reservations. 98 The Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs (SCIA) ordered the SAVE Act to be reported to the Senate,
with the recommendation that it be passed, on December 27, 2012,
after which the Senate Judiciary Committee incorporated its core
provisions into the 2013 VAWA Reauthorization.99
Without criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribes had not
seen similar successes in decreasing rates of domestic violence in
their communities. Given that 80% of Native American victims of
rape or sexual assault describe their attackers as white, 100 tribes
were unable to prosecute most sexual and domestic abuse
offenders. Moreover, in 2010, federal prosecutors declined 67% of
sexual abuse cases in Indian country. 101 Because the federal
government had exclusive jurisdiction over all major crimes and
crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country, tribes were
often unable to punish non-Indian criminals in their own

96

S. REP. NO. 112-265, at 5 (2012).
Id. at 5, 39 & Table 10; See also RONET BACHMAN, ET AL., VIOLENCE
AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN, (2008)
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf.
98
Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers,
and Daughters, Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 9-10 (2011)
(Prepared remarks from Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice). (“The first area for potential Federal legislation involves
recognizing certain tribes’ concurrent criminal jurisdiction to investigate,
prosecute, convict and sentence Indians and non-Indians who assault Indian
spouses, intimate partners, or dating partners, or who violate protection orders,
in Indian country.”).
99
Id.
100
See STEVEN W. PERRY, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, A BJS STATISTICAL
PROFILE, 1992-2002, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 9
(2004) (noting that nearly 4 in 5 American Indian victims of rape/sexual assault
described the offender as white).
101
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–11–167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 3–9
(2010).
97
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communities. 102 This gave non-Indian perpetrators free reign on
many reservations, and incentivized non-Indian people to target
Indian women.103 With jurisdiction over 20% of domestic violence
and/or sexual violence perpetrators, tribal governments were
unable to protect their communities.
On the Senate floor, critics emphasized that Congress voted
unanimously “on the two previous occasions the Senate has voted
to reauthorize the VAWA.” 104 However, in 2013 “the key
stumbling block [was] the [Indian] provision.”105 Disregarding the
serious epidemic of violence experienced by Native women,
VAWA 2013 opponents labeled the Title IX amendment as “just
another vehicle for scoring political points or bowing to special
interests.” 106 Senator Cornyn explained that the reason for
Republican opposition was the “blatantly unconstitutional” SDVCJ
that would “deny U.S. citizens their full constitutional protections
under the Bill of Rights in tribal courts,” and offered an
amendment allowing SDVCJ “as long as those tribes followed the
Constitution and allowed all convictions to be appealed in the
Federal court system.”107
Proponents of the bill responded on the senate floor. Senator
Cantwell emphasized that habeas corpus remained available to test
constitutionally-deficient tribal convictions under ICRA in the
federal courts. 108 She also criticized the competing amendment’s
use of exclusive federal jurisdiction, asking “who will prosecute
these crimes?” if tribes were prevented from conducting their own
prosecutions. 109 Given that “four out of five perpetrators of
domestic or sexual violence on tribal lands are non-Indian and
102

Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (2008)).
103
Hearing on S. 1763, S. 872, & S. 1192, Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 112th Cong. 9 (2011) (statement of Thomas J. Perrelli, Assoc. Att’y
General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ‘‘[T]he current jurisdictional framework has left
many serious acts of domestic and dating violence unprosecuted and
unpunished’’).
104
159 CONG. REC. S497–99 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Cornyn).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. This view of tribal criminal jurisdiction structure would have federalized
SDVCJ, making convictions in tribal courts challengeable on direct appeal
rather than through writ of habeas corpus.
108
159 CONG. REC. S506 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Cantwell).
109
Id.
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currently cannot be prosecuted by tribal governments,” the
amendment allowed tribes to participate in the “locally based
solutions to domestic violence that VAWA has so successfully
promoted.”110 These protections would build on the TLOA, so that
“no one [w]ould get away with domestic violence and rape” in
Indian country.111 Proponents of VAWA 2013 “work[ed] with the
Indian Affairs Committee … to fill a loophole in jurisdiction over
perpetrators who have significant ties to the tribe in a very limited
set of domestic violence cases involving an Indian victim on Indian
land.” 112 Senator Leahy ensured VAWA 2013 “would …
guarantee[] defendants comprehensive rights.”113
Although agreeing with the majority that SDVCJ requires
tribes prosecuting non-Indian defendants all the rights guaranteed
by the United States Constitution, the minority questioned the
“resources” and “expertise” of tribes to do so. 114 The minority
senators asked, “on what basis does [the majority] think that the
relatively small amount of money to provide grants to tribes will
be sufficient to ensure that these defendants will be provided with
all rights in all prosecutions authorized under [SDVCJ]?”115 The
minority then also questioned “the estimate on caseload, cost, and
other effects on the docket of federal district courts that would
have to consider habeas corpus proceedings brought after tribal
courts exercised their inherent powers under [VAWA 2013].”116
The minority concluded that Senator Grassley’s substitute
amendment would “best… improve the enforcement of laws
against domestic violence in Indian territory” by providing
appropriate resources for the federal government to fulfill those
important responsibilities. 117 The majority pointed out that tribal
investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by non-Indians
on reservation lands “will be more efficient and more effective
than creating a massive new infrastructure, moving law

110

159 CONG. REC. S480 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar).
159 CONG. REC. S499 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2013) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
112
158 CONG. REC. S1991 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
113
Id.
114
S. REP NO. 112-153, at 38 (2012) (minority views from Senators Grassley,
Hatch, Kyl, and Cornyn).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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enforcement and prosecutors often hours away from their current
locations.”118
C.

Potential Future Expansion of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction

Within current Indian law jurisprudence, there is already a
rationale for further expansion of tribal criminal jurisdiction. In
Montana v. U.S., the Court extended its Oliphant rule to tribal civil
jurisdiction by announcing that “the inherent sovereign powers of
an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of
the tribe.”119 The Court created two exceptions to the Montana rule
because “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”120 First, “a tribe may
regulate …activities of non-members who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members.” 121 Second, “a tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee land within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.” 122 The Montana exceptions preserve a tribe’s regulatory
authority over non-members “connected to that ‘right of the
Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them.’”123
VAWA 2013 clearly, statutorily affirms inherent tribal
jurisdiction under similar rationales to the two Montana
exceptions. By limiting jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants to
those with sufficient ties to the Indian tribe, Congress emulated the
Montana “consensual relationship” exception. 124 A consensual
relationship means SDVCJ defendants must “reside in the Indian
country of the participating tribe,”125 be “employed in the Indian

118

S. REP NO. 112-153, at 11, n.26 (2012).
Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
120
Id. at 565.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 566.
123
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959)).
124
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §
904(b)(4)(B), 127 Stat. 121 (2013) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 1304; § 904(b)(4)(B),
127 Stat. at 122).
125
Id. at § 904(b)(4)(B)(i), 127 Stat. at 122.
119
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country of the participating tribe,” 126 or be a “spouse, intimate
partner, or dating partner of a member of the participating tribe or
an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the participating
tribe.”127
The concern for the safety of Native women outlined in the
legislative history of VAWA 2013 128 falls within the second
Montana exception providing that “tribe[s] may regulate
nonmember conduct where that conduct ‘threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.’” 129 Although the Supreme Court
created an “elevated threshold … that tribal power must be
necessary to avert catastrophic consequences” for meeting the
second Montana exception, this rationale is especially pertinent to
the rampant domestic violence that Native American women face
in Indian country. 130 While the elevated “catastrophic
consequences” 131 has made the second Montana exception little
more than a “dead letter” in the civil context, 132 the passage of
VAWA 2013 shows Congress may be willing to legislatively limit
the restrictions of tribal jurisdiction under the second Montana
exception rationale in the criminal context.
Although federal courts have already developed tribal
exhaustion jurisprudence, most of the federal courts’ forays into
habeas review of tribal criminal prosecutions occurred before
Congress established SDVCJ, and cases involving non-Indian
defendants only reached the jurisdictional issues.133 Thus, current

Id. at § 904(b)(4)(B)(ii), 127 Stat. at 122.
Id. at § 904(b)(4)(B)(iii)(I, II), 127 Stat. at 122.
128
See supra Section I.B, Legislative History of VAWA 2013.
129
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 394 (2001) (citing Montana v. U.S. 450 U.S.
544, 566 (1981).
130
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
341 (2008).
131
Id.
132
Philip H. Tinker, In Search of a Civil Solution: Tribal Authority to Regulate
NonMember Conduct in Indian Country, 50 TULSA L. REV. 193, 205 (2014)
(Noting tribe met the high bar of jurisdiction in Water Wheel Camp Recreational
Area, Inc. v. LaRance, where tribe has Montana II jurisdiction over a holdover
tenant on tribal land, 642 F.3d 802, 819 (9th Cir. 2011), and Montana II
jurisdiction established over non-Indian private security guards who conducted
armed raid on the tribe’s government intending to take it over in Attorney’s
Process and Investigation Servs., Inc., v. Sac and Fox Tribe of the Miss. in Iowa,
609 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010)).
133
See Garrow study, infra note 209.
126
127
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law regarding tribal exhaustion for criminal convictions was
created with the backdrop of Oliphant’s complete exemption of
non-Indians from tribal criminal jurisdiction. Absent a judicial
overruling of Oliphant, tribes should continue to look to Congress
to reinforce tribal sovereignty by adopting Montana-style
legislative exceptions for tribal criminal jurisdiction. Senator
Tester already introduced such legislation to expand tribal
jurisdiction over child violence and drug offenses in the Tribal
Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016 and other criminal
areas dealing with the “health or welfare of the tribe.”134
II.FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Federal habeas corpus relief provides "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action" and “insure[s] that miscarriages of justice
within its reach are surfaced and corrected." 135 The doctrine of
federal habeas corpus enables federal courts to “release or retry
prisoners held in violation of the Federal Constitution.” 136
Originally established in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the habeas
corpus review of the federal courts only reached jurisdictional
errors of federal convictions. However, in 1867, Congress
expanded federal habeas corpus review to cover unconstitutional
state convictions to protect civil rights after the Civil War.137 When
federal courts decide habeas petitions from state prisoners, the
state appellate courts are given deference to interpret state and
federal law in the first instance and have the ability to avoid federal
reversal of convictions through interpretation of state law.138 Only
134

Tribal Youth and Community Protection Act of 2016, S. 2785, 114 th Cong., §

4.
135

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus--Retroactivity of Post-Conviction Rulings:
Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, 976
(1994).
137
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 224154 (2016)).
138
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a-c) (2000) (Congress establishes statutory exhaustion
requirement); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (Supreme Court first adopts
the Exhaustion Doctrine); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 434-35 (1963) (defining a
test for the exhaustion requirement); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982)
(all claims in a multipart habeas petition may be dismissed if the petitioner fails
to exhaust any of the claims); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)
(overruling Fay, in favor of upholding the finality of state court determinations).
136
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after petitioners exhaust all of their state remedies are they able to
petition the federal courts for habeas review. Overarching all of
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence are the principles of comity,
finality, fairness and judicial economy of the federal courts.139
Supreme Court decisions and prior amendments of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867 controlled federal habeas review.140 In passing
AEDPA, Congress made it more difficult for state habeas
petitioners to obtain federal review, much less receive relief in
federal court.141 The expansions of civil rights and constitutional
protections of the Bill of Rights against the states created minimum
federal standards of due process throughout the country.142
In recent years, both the Supreme Court and Congress have
severely restricted the availability of habeas review for
petitioners. 143 In 1989, the Supreme Court limited application of
the Retroactivity Doctrine, wherein a new criminal procedure rule
cannot be applied to habeas petitioner’s whose conviction has
already become final. 144 Congress limited habeas relief in the
federal courts for state and federal petitioners by passing the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996.145
Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court’s Habeas Reform, 83
CAL. L. REV. 485, 489 (1995); Karen M. Marshall, Finding Time for Federal
Habeas Corpus: Carey v. Saffold, 33 AKRON L. REV. 549, 574 (2004).
140
Pre-AEDPA habeas review included procedural defaults of claims by
petitioners under Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (no constitutional right
to counsel for collateral attacks on state convictions under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)), non-retroactive application of Supreme
Court precedent on constitutional criminal procedure to finalized cases under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and harmless error review, which requires
that trial errors have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict,” under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623
(1992).
141
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1996) (AEDPA added a one-year filing deadline for
state habeas petitioners); U.S.C. § 2264(a) (limited cognizable substantive
claims reviewable on habeas); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (mandated federal courts to
generally defer to state court conclusions of federal law); 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1), (c)(3) (required circuit court judges to grant permission to appeal
lower court denials of habeas petitions, limited to the issues specified); 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1-2).
142
Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus--Retroactivity of Post-Conviction Rulings:
Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, 977
(1994).
143
Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking The Federal Role In State
Criminal Justice, 84. N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 792-94 (2009).
144
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
145
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
139
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AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on individual
habeas claims 146 and codified the Supreme Court’s state court
remedy exhaustion rule.147 Most detrimental to habeas petitioners
is AEDPA’s requirement that “any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits” is barred from federal habeas review “unless the
adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.”148
In contrast, federal habeas review of tribal SDVCJ convictions
is much more expansive. Unlike state court petitioners who wait
years for federal habeas review, SDVCJ defendants have
immediate federal habeas review, a right to petition for a stay of
tribal detention, and the option to forego tribal appellate
procedures and apply directly to the federal courts. 149 In 1968,
Congress provided by statute “the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus … to any person … to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe in a court of the United States.”150 ICRA
provided individual rights, similar to the Bill of Rights, to Indians
to protect them from their tribal governments.151 Although ICRA
provided tribal citizens pseudo-constitutional individual rights, the
Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez that ICRA
did not create a civil cause of action to sue tribes in federal court to
enforce those rights.152 In holding that ICRA only provided habeas
corpus relief to tribal convictions and not any form of federal civil
action, the Court explained that:

146

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2010).
148
Id. at § 2254(d).
149
25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(2) (2013).
150
25 U.S.C. § 1303.
151
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-02.
152
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978) (“ICRA was
generally understood to authorize federal judicial review of tribal actions only
through the habeas corpus provisions of § 1303. … Congress' rejection of
proposals that clearly would have authorized causes of action other than habeas
corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware of the intrusive effect of federal
judicial review upon tribal self-government, [and] intended to create only a
limited mechanism for such review, namely, that provided for expressly in §
1303.”).
147
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In settling on habeas corpus as the
exclusive means for federal court
review
of
tribal
criminal
proceedings, Congress opted for a
less intrusive review mechanism than
had
been
initially
proposed.
Originally, the legislation would
have authorized de novo review in
federal court of all convictions
obtained in tribal courts. At hearings
held on the proposed legislation in
1965, however, it became clear that
even those in agreement with the
general thrust of the review
provision–to provide some form of
judicial
review
of
criminal
proceedings in tribal courts–believed
that de novo review would impose
unmanageable financial burdens on
tribal governments and needlessly
displace tribal courts. Moreover,
tribal representatives argued that de
novo review would "deprive the
tribal court of all jurisdiction in the
event of an appeal, thus having a
harmful effect upon law enforcement
within the reservation," and urged
instead that "decisions of tribal
courts . . . be reviewed in the U.S.
district courts upon petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.153
Because Santa Clara prevents tribal civil litigants from seeking
federal review, many Indian litigants have attempted to disguise
their civil claims as habeas petitions to gain a federal forum for
intra-tribal disputes. This has resulted in few ICRA habeas cases
reaching the merits of the §1303 habeas petitions, and thus a dearth
of substantive habeas jurisprudence that controls collateral attacks

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978) (“After considering
numerous alternatives for review of tribal convictions, Congress apparently
decided that review by way of habeas corpus would adequately protect the
individual interests at stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on tribal
governments”); see also id. at 70.
153
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of tribal convictions. 154 Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians provides an extensive analysis of an ICRA habeas
petition.155 In Poodry, the Seneca government banished a member
after a contentious election. The Second Circuit held that, while
banishment was not a criminal punishment, it was a sufficient
restraint on liberty to qualify as “detention” under ICRA, thereby
establishing federal court §1303 habeas jurisdiction.156 The Poodry
court reasoned that banishment is essentially the same as being “in
custody” in the rest of the world outside of the reservation. 157
Neither federal common law nor 18 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas
jurisprudence has interpreted the “in custody” requirement this
broadly.
This expansive reading of “detention” in ICRA Section 1303
habeas has had limited effect. The federal courts have generally
interpreted “detention” as similar to AEDPA’s “in custody”
requirement and have prevented civil litigants from disguising civil
issues as habeas corpus issues. 158 Some federal circuits have
explicitly contradicted Poodry by holding that banishment from a
reservation does not amount to detention under ICRA.159
VAWA 2013 opponents harbored great concerns over the
protection of defendants’ constitutional rights in SDVCJ
prosecutions 160 because tribal governments are not restrained by

154

See generally, Garrow study infra note 203.
85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996).
156
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 877 (2d Cir.
1996).
157
Id. at 895. (“We believe that Congress could not have intended to permit a
tribe to circumvent the ICRA's habeas provision by permanently banishing,
rather than imprisoning, [convicted] members [ ]. The severity of banishment as
a restraint on liberty is well demonstrated by the Supreme Court's treatment of [
] “denaturalization” proceedings”).
158
See Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Tribal member’s disenrollment, tribal employment termination, prohibition
from tribal businesses and speaking to some tribal members did not constitute
“detention.”); see also Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.Sup.2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)
(Tribal member and family excluded from tribal services did not amount to
detention.); see also Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 275 F.Supp.2d 279 (N.D.N.Y.
2003)(Zealous tribal enforcement of tribal housing code did not constitute
detention).
159
Alire v. Jackson, 65 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1129 (D. Or. 1999) (despite exclusion,
“Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a severe actual or potential restraint on her
liberty sufficient to give rise to habeas relief”).
160
See supra Section I.B, Legislative History of VAWA 2013
155
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the United States Constitution. 161 However, habeas corpus
challenges gain even more importance in the tribal (rather than
state or federal) court context because the writ is the only vehicle
for developing the law applicable to federal habeas challenges of
tribal convictions. Additionally, there are no federal forums
available for civil claims 162 against tribal officers that would
otherwise be actionable against state and federal actors under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 163 or Bivens actions, 164 respectively. Because the
Court foreclosed tribal review of § 1983 claims in Nevada v.
Hicks, complainants are limited to tribal laws enforced through
tribal court decisions. 165 Although § 1983 claims are not
enforceable against tribes in federal court, and tribal courts do not
have subject matter jurisdiction for such claims, 166 tribes may
develop their own equivalent laws or even waive immunity for
these suits.
Ultimately, ICRA § 1303 habeas review provides the only
federal forum for tribal court defendants to challenge
unconstitutional convictions. Although the United States
Constitution does not directly apply to tribes, ICRA and TLOA
provide constitutionally equivalent protections that ensure tribal
court defendants receive similar individual rights as state court. If
federal courts apply Indian law precedent, the ICRA statutory
framework will still correspond with state habeas review standards
in preventing the most egregious constitutional harms against
defendants, 167 while protecting tribal sovereignty and promoting
tribal governance.
Talton, 163 U.S. at 385 (conviction was “solely a matter within the
jurisdiction of the courts of that Nation, and the decision of such a question, in
itself, necessarily involves no infraction of the Constitution of the United
States.”).
162
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59-72.
163
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action for a “person who, under
the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, … subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution.” Such person “shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
164
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
165
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366 (2001) (holding that tribal courts are not
courts of general jurisdiction and thus cannot adjudicate federal claims in the
same manner as their state court counterparts).
166
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49 (upholding sovereign immunity).
167
Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV.
1, 11 (2010).
161
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Indian tribes are “distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights.”168 “As separate sovereigns
pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded
as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed
specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.” 169 Even
after all Indians were granted American citizenship in 1924, and
the Bill of Rights was applied to the states through selective
incorporation, tribal courts remained unconstrained by the
individual rights protections in the United States Constitution. This
changed in 1968, when Senator Sam Ervin shepherded ICRA
through Congress to expand civil rights to Native Americans. 170
Although framed as an expansion of civil rights to Native
Americans, ICRA had a more nefarious purpose. Senator Ervin
“tried to duplicate the North Carolina assimilation experience on a
national level” 171 by “subject[ing tribes] to the same limitations
and restraints as those which are imposed on the [U.S.]
Government.”172
The ICRA established statutory protections of individual
liberties for Native Americans in tribal courts. Concern in
Congress over the lack of constitutional constraints on tribal
governments led to its passage. However, it provided no federal
cause of action for civil cases or criminal cases not resulting in
detention for federal habeas corpus purposes.173 Because the ICRA
habeas provision applies to “all persons” and not just tribal
members or Indians,174 ICRA provides the only federal guarantees
of due process and equal protection in tribal courts.175
The VAWA 2013 amendments build on the Santa Clara rule
precluding federal civil review while allowing habeas relief for
criminal convictions regardless of Indian status. 176 By restricting
168

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
170
Robert Berry, Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty after the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1993).
171
Donald Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 ‘Indian Civil Rights'
Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 575 (1972).
172
111 CONG. REC. S1799 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin).
173
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49.
174
25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2011).
175
Id.
176
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
169
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federal review under ICRA to the criminal context, the Santa
Clara doctrine protects tribal sovereignty. Further expanding
ICRA review would violate the “right of the reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them.”177
ICRA’s § 1303 habeas corpus provision is subject to the same
test for jurisdiction as “other statutory provisions governing habeas
relief.”178 To “invoke jurisdiction of a federal court under § 1303
[one] must demonstrate, under Jones v. Cunningham and its
progeny, a severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.” 179 In
Jones, the Court interpreted the “in custody” requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 2241, which provided a federal forum for collateral
appellate review of state convictions.180 The Jones court held that
state parole entailed sufficient “restraints” on liberty to warrant
habeas relief. 181 These restraints on liberty included directing
petitioner to live with his aunt in Georgia, requiring permission to
leave the community, change residence, or own or operate a car,
reporting to his parole officer every month, and allowing home
searches at will. 182 This federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was
originally established in the aftermath of the Civil War when
Congress passed the Habeas Act of 1867 to extend the writ to state
custody for “cases where any person may be restrained of his or
her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law
of the United States.”183
Though many areas of Indian law are unique, by adopting §
1303, “Congress did not…intend to create jurisdictional
requirements different from those associated with traditional
habeas remedies.” 184 This holding relates not only to § 1303
language, but also to the treatment of petitioners. The fact that
§1303 refers to “detention” by a tribe rather than being held “in
177

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880.
179
Id. (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)) (holding that “besides
physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not
shared by the public generally,” including parole).
180
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (“The Writ of habeas shall not extend to a person unless
he is in custody”).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1462 (14th ed. 2015)
(citing Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 318 (1867) (describing the Habeas Act
of 1867)).
184
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 893 n. 21.
178
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custody” by a state for federal collateral review under § 2254185 is
“unremarkable,” given that “Congress… use[s] the terms
‘detention’ and ‘custody’ interchangeably in the habeas
context.” 186 The Poodry court held that § 1303 federal habeas
review is no “more expansive…than analogous statutes authorizing
collateral review of state and federal action.”187 The Poodry Court
explicitly reserved the question of “whether the substantive
provisions of § 1302 must also be treated as coextensive with
analogous constitutional provisions.”188
Although the Poodry Court did not define the scope of § 1303
habeas review, other federal circuits began a limited incorporation
of a constitutional approach of rights through their ICRA
counterparts. In U.S. v. Schmidt, the Eighth Circuit held that ICRA
was not violated by the exigency doctrine to justify tribal police
actions.189 In dictum, the Ninth Circuit has found that the ICRA
and 4th Amendment standards are equivalent, in any event.190
Although limited in number, these cases foreshadow a judicial
process similar to the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights
through ICRA’s §1303 habeas review onto ICRA’s statutory
procedural rights. This fragile statutory patchwork of ICRA’s
pseudo-constitutional rights, and the court’s constitutional
jurisprudence, will allow tribes to exercise their inherent
sovereignty so long as they assert their jurisdiction in ways that
coincide with United States constitutional standards. Otherwise,
federal courts will overturn their convictions on habeas review.191
This jerry-rigged statutory scheme protecting federal individual
rights will constrain tribal courts through federal review, but
preserve the core of tribal sovereignty as conceived under
Worcester v. Georgia and Talton v. Mayes in the tribes’ internal
affairs.

185

Id. at 891.
Id.
187
Id. at 901.
188
Id. at 893 n. 21.
189
United States v. Schmidt, 403 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2005).
190
United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Fuentes, 800 F.Supp.2d 1144 (D. Or. 2011).
191
For example, intra-tribal criminal misdemeanors and civil issues will remain
completely within tribal judicial control.
186
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The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine

The doctrine of exhaustion is a fundamental aspect of habeas
corpus across various legal contexts. The basis for the federal
exhaustion requirement is to preserve the resources of the federal
judiciary and to respect the sovereignty of the states and tribes in
the federal system. Besides limiting federal jurisdictional reach
over tribal proceedings, the doctrine of tribal exhaustion also limits
federal review of tribal courts. The tribal exhaustion requirement is
a judicial rule based in comity between the federal and tribal
sovereigns where both sovereigns have concurrent jurisdiction
over a claim.192 The doctrine is supported by the following three
policy concerns: (1) “Congress[’s] commit[ment] to…supporting
tribal self-government and self-determination”; (2) the “orderly
administration of justice in the federal court[s]” through the
development of a full record in tribal court; and (3) the provision
of the tribal courts’ “expertise…in the precise basis for accepting
jurisdiction” to federal courts in appellate review.193 Requiring a
party to exhaust tribal remedies allows the tribal court a “full
opportunity … to rectify any errors it may have made.” 194 This
means that, “at a minimum … tribal appellate courts must have the
opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts”
before parties can seek federal jurisdiction.195
However, National Farmers created several exceptions to the
requirement of tribal exhaustion. 196 First, exhaustion is not
required if the tribal court intended to harass the party or claimed
jurisdiction in bad faith.197 Second, if the tribal court’s assertion of
jurisdiction violates an express jurisdictional prohibition, then the
defendant is not subject to the exhaustion doctrine.198 Third, tribal
exhaustion does not apply if a tribal appellate review would be
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
847 (1985); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Federal Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, 186 A.L.R. FED. 71 (2003).
193
Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856; Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1375 (10th
Cir. 1993).
194
Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856).
195
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987).
196
Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856, n. 21.
197
Id.
198
Id.
192
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futile because there is no tribal forum, there is no relief available,
or tribal review is biased.199 The Court subsequently emphasized in
Strate v. A-1 Contractors that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual,
“enunciate only an exhaustion requirement, a ‘prudential rule,’
based on comity” and that regarding nonmembers, “a tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction.” 200 Strate also added one more exception to tribal
exhaustion: “‘[w]hen...it is plain that no federal grant provides for
tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land covered by
Montana's main rule,’ the exhaustion requirement ‘would serve no
purpose other than delay.’”201
Although federal Indian law jurisprudence has created many
exceptions to the tribal exhaustion rule, courts have generally
enforced the rule. After the Supreme Court’s 1978 Oliphant
decision to exempt non-Indians from tribal criminal jurisdiction,
the only ICRA habeas questions to arise in federal court essentially
have been jurisdictional challenges to tribal authority. Because of
the Supreme Court’s Oliphant exemption for non-Indians, “the
development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian
Country has been markedly different from the development of
rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction.” 202 Although few cases
have reached federal review on the merits, the federal courts have
developed a tribal exhaustion rule doctrine for habeas challenges to
tribal convictions. 203 In the post-VAWA world, however, with
explicit tribal jurisdiction for domestic violence crimes, these
original principles of tribal exhaustion developed in the civil
context have become applicable to Indian and non-Indian habeas
challenges. Whereas some circuits have perceived an exception for
non-Indian defendants, this was simply the application of the
National Farmers’ lack of tribal jurisdiction exception and Strate’s
delay exception in the criminal context.

199

Id.
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
201
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 459,
n.14).
202
Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 253 (1982)).
203
See generally Carrie E. Garrow, Habeas Corpus Petitions In Federal And
Tribal Courts: A Search For Individualized Justice, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 137 (2015).
200
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In reviewing ICRA § 1304(e)(2) challenges requesting
immediate stays of detention, a federal court must base the
“substantial likelihood” standard in existing Indian law
jurisprudence. While habeas petitions have an underlying criminal
conviction, these challenges are in fact civil in nature, and thus
without more specific language in ICRA stating otherwise,
National Farmers and its progeny provide existing precedent for
federal courts to apply towards their analysis of immediate stays of
detention. If petitioners do not meet these National Farmers’
exceptions, then a federal court may not grant relief under § 1303
and § 1304.
As different tribes exercise their inherent jurisdiction through
prosecution of domestic and dating violence crimes involving both
Indian and non-Indian defendants, the need for tribal appellate
courts to review errors will necessarily grow. While TLOA and
ICRA require public notice of tribal laws, judicial interpretation
will still allow tribes to decide, in the first instance how to interpret
their laws and whether certain ICRA rights are understood, similar
to United States constitutional law. Until the tribal courts decide a
SDVCJ appellate case, a federal court cannot interpret tribal laws
in habeas review and thus usurp the jurisdiction granted to it under
ICRA. Furthermore, the complexities of SDVCJ may raise
jurisdictional and procedural errors that should be reviewed by the
tribal appellate courts. Respecting tribal sovereignty with
exhaustion requirements in these cases not only helps develop
tribal law and keep tribal governments accountable but also
promotes judicial economy and efficiency when considering §
1303 petitions.
Because of the barrier to federal court review established by
Santa Clara, tribal petitioners have often attempted to expand the
meaning of “detention” in the ICRA context 204 beyond the “in
custody” requirement of AEDPA. 205 However, “the term
‘detention’ in the [ICRA] statute must be interpreted similarly to
the ‘in custody’ requirement in other habeas contexts.”206 Thus, “a
204

See e.g., Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d
Cir. 1996). (arguing that banishment was detention); Lewis v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, No. CV-12-8073-PCT-SRB (DKD), 2013 WL 510111 (D. Ariz.
Jan. 24, 2013) (petitioner’s liberty not restrained where tribe denied his bid to
run for political office).
205
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2011).
206
Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir.2001).
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federal court has no jurisdiction to hear a petitioner's claim for
habeas corpus under § 1303 unless the petitioner is (1) in custody
and (2) has exhausted all tribal remedies.” 207 The federal courts
explicitly defer to Congress’s exclusive authority over “any
expansion[s] of [§ 1303 habeas] jurisdiction.” 208 In ICRA,
Congress has given unprecedented relief to tribal court petitioners
through immediate habeas review and interim relief through
immediate stays of detention. In contrast, the federal habeas review
to collaterally attack state convictions explicitly requires
exhaustion of state remedies by statute. 209 Given the incredible
difference in remedy a tribal court defendant has under § 1303
versus the remedy a state court defendant has under § 2254, federal
courts must interpret the “substantial likelihood” standard with
great care and deference to Congress while maintaining current
federal Indian law jurisprudence.
Federal courts have followed the National Farmers tribal
exhaustion rule in the habeas context, “recogniz[ing] that a
petitioner must fully exhaust tribal-court remedies before a federal
court can review challenges to his detention.” 210 The National
Farmers’ exceptions allow petitioners to seek immediate federal
review in the criminal habeas context.211 Thus, while tribal civil
and criminal jurisdictions have developed in significantly different
ways, 212 several federal circuits require “that § 1303 petitioners
must exhaust tribal court remedies … despite § 1303's lack of an
express exhaustion requirement.” 213 Despite being “a prudential

207

Lewis, 2013 WL 510111, at 12 (citing Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913,
918 (2010)).
208
Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 918.
209
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (2012).
210
Acosta-Vigil v. Delorme-Gaines, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1196 (2009) (citing
Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d 931, 935 (2004)); see also Azure–Lone Fight v.
Cain, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1150 (2004); Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948,
971–72 (2004); Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F.Supp. 1434, 1436 (1997).
211
Garrow, supra note 203, at 149-50.
212
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2009).
213
Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (2012); see also Jeffredo,
590 F.3d at 756 (“[A] litigant must first exhaust tribal remedies before properly
bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to § 1303]”); Necklace v.
Tribal Court of Three Affiliated Tribes, 554 F.2d 845, 846 (1977) (“[T]ribal
remedies must ordinarily be exhausted before a claim is asserted in federal court
under [§ 1303]”); see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 4.01 (Supp.2009) (“All federal courts addressing the issue mandate that two
prerequisites be satisfied before they will hear a habeas petition filed under
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rule based on comity,”214 federal courts have consistently upheld
the exhaustion doctrine in § 1303 petitions. Under VAWA 2013,
the federal courts must apply federal law to the § 1303 petitions,
which directly incorporate the National Farmers’ exceptions into
the “substantial likelihood” standard for reviewing requests for
immediate stays under § 1304(e). Thus, if a petitioner does not
meet one of these exceptions, then the petitioner has not shown “a
substantial likelihood that the habeas corpus petition will be
granted”215 under § 1303.
A recent survey of the federal courts’ treatment of tribal court
convictions during federal habeas review found only thirty cases of
substantive federal habeas court decisions on ICRA habeas
petitions. 216 Out of the thirty cases, fifteen were “dismissed for
failure to exhaust tribal court remedies,” five involved non-Indian
defendants not subjected to the exhaustion rule,217 and ten received
a federal review after exhaustion of tribal court remedies. Out of
the ten ICRA habeas petitions achieving federal habeas review on
the merits of the petitions, six were granted habeas relief and four
were denied.218
The survey concluded that the “federal courts’ deferral to tribal
courts is citizenship based”219 because the “non-Indian status of the
petitioner” is the “most common exception … to the exhaustion
requirement.”220 She points to Oliphant and Duro, where the Court
“proceed[ed] directly to the question of the tribal court’s
jurisdiction.” 221 However, the Duro Court reviewed a tribal
member’s § 1303 petition before the legislative Duro-fix, rather
than a non-Indian’s habeas petition as in Oliphant.222
Several cases weigh against this non-Indian exemption of the
tribal exhaustion rule. In Greywater v. Joshua 223 the Court held
ICRA: The petitioner must be in custody, and the petitioner must first exhaust
tribal remedies”).
214
Valenzuela,699 F.3d at 1206-07.
215
25 U.S.C. § 1304(e)(2)(A) (2013).
216
Garrow, supra note 203, at 148.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 150.
220
Id. at 148.
221
Garrow, supra note 203, at 151.
222
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-85 (1990); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-96 (1978).
223
Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (1988).
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that a non-member Indian petitioner was not required to exhaust
his tribal court remedies in a case that pre-dated the Duro-fix. In
Connor v. Conklin, 224 the North Dakota District Court did not
require a tribal member petitioner to exhaust tribal remedies;
however, the tribe “did not raise the exhaustion requirement, and
the court failed to address it.”225 Although this may demonstrate
that § 1303 does not require express waiver of the exhaustion
requirement as AEDPA does,226 Connor does not support a tribal
exhaustion exception for non-Indian § .1303 petitioners.
The Ninth Circuit has noted that despite “the federal district
court entertain[ing Duro’s] habeas petition immediately after the
tribal court had denied [his] motion to dismiss” the tribe made “no
objection to the petition on the ground that the petitioner had not
exhausted his tribal remedies.” 227 From this, the Wetsit court
“infer[red] that when a tribal court attempts to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over a person not a member of a tribe, no requirement
of exhaustion need be enforced.” 228 Although scholars have
previously cited this non-Indian tribal appeals exemption rule as
good law, 229 no court has established such a rule. However, the
Wetsit court mentioned this rule in dicta, comparing tribal
exhaustion of “a person not a member of a tribe,” where “no
requirement of exhaustion need be enforced” to “when the
petitioner is a member of the tribe.” 230 The fact that the Wetsit
Court did not “note or observe that Congress had subsequently
changed the Duro ruling by [] amendment,” nor did the Court’s
“dicta statement [] refer to the amendment to 25 U.S.C. § 1301
which confers criminal jurisdiction over ‘all Indians,’” nor “even
mention 25 U.S.C. § 1301” shows “the dicta in Wetsit is without
merit and incorrect.”231 Even if the Duro-fix had not taken effect
already, the non-member remedy requirement was not properly
before the Court, since both Wetsit and her victim were tribal
members.

224

Connor v. Conklin, No. A4-04-50, 2004 WL 1242513 (D.N.D. June 2, 2004).
Garrow, supra note 203, at 152; Connor, No. A4-04-50, at *1-5.
226
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (2011).
227
Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995).
228
Id.
229
Garrow, supra note 203, at 150-51.
230
Westsit, 44 F.3d at 826.
231
Lyda v. Tah-Bone, 962 F.Supp. 1434, 1435 (D. Utah, 1997).
225
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In Wetsit, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of an Indian’s § 1303 habeas petition, where Wetsit
challenged her tribal detention for manslaughter charges after
Wetsit stabbed her husband, also a Fort Peck tribal member, to
death. 232 The Fort Peck Tribal Court sentenced her to one year
after a jury acquitted her in federal court under the Major Crimes
Act.233 The district court dismissed her petition because she failed
to exhaust her tribal remedies.234 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a tribe has “jurisdiction over major crimes committed by a
tribal member,” despite Wetsit’s “acquittal under the Major Crimes
Act” by federal court.235 Lastly, the Wetsit Court agreed that tribal
members must exhaust all tribal remedies.
Petitioner’s counsel did brief the court on tribal exhaustion,
“respectfully submit[ting] that… the exhaustion requirement
should not be imposed in criminal cases,”236 as petitioner had to, in
order to argue the Major Crimes Act jurisdictional matter.
Petitioner argued that had “Congress intended an exhaustion
requirement for tribal prisoners, it would have expressly provided
for one as it did in § 2254” since it was “codified long prior” to
§1303 habeas in 1968.237
The Ninth Circuit repeated its original misinterpretation of the
Duro-fix in In re Garvais, holding that §1303 “does not require
Garvais [a non-Indian BIA officer] to first exhaust his challenges
in tribal court before seeking habeas relief in this court.”238 Much
of the issue reviewed by the court was Garvais’s status as a nonIndian because he “had been improperly granted [his Indian]
preference” for his employment as a BIA officer. 239 The Court
incorrectly based this rule on Wetsit and on Means v. Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Court,240 which the Ninth Circuit later clarified
232

Wetsit, 44 F.3d at 824.
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 826.
236
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Westsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, (9th Cir.
1995) 1994 WL 16048224, at *6-7.
237
Id. at 8.
238
In re Garvais, 402 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1220 (2004) (citing Wetsit, 44 F.3d at
826); see also Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F.3d 941, 942
(9th Cir. 1998) (rev'd on other grounds, U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2001)).
239
In re Garvais, 402 F.Supp.2d at 1222.
240
Means, 154 F.3d at 942.
233
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held that the “1990 ICRA amendments do not apply retroactively
and that, under Duro, Means was not subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of another tribe.”241 The In re Garvais Court claimed
that Means was reversed on other grounds in U.S. v. Enas, where
the court attempted to reconcile its previous decisions’ improper
readings of the Duro-fix.242 However, while Enas did not rule on §
1303 exhaustion requirements directly, it clearly contradicted the
foundational Duro-related principles that Wetsit and its misguided
progeny were based upon.
Even including the Oliphant decision, no federal court has held
the non-Indian status of a § 1303 habeas petitioner to be an
exception to the National Farmers tribal exhaustion requirement.
Nor should the courts create one based on the same policy issues of
comity and federal court administrative concerns. Doing so goes
against Congress’s policy of “tribal support”243 and would open up
further litigation stagnating federal dockets with further ICRAspecific habeas jurisprudence. Because the § 1303 habeas
jurisprudence is so undeveloped, many issues that have been
resolved in the § 2254 context must be extended by analogy or
fully litigated through collateral attacks on tribal convictions.
III.A NEW HABEAS CORPUS JURISPRUDENCE?
Although seemingly innocuous, the immediate stay of
detention petition provision raises several potential problems to the
federal courts’ judicial jurisprudence of § 1303 habeas relief. If
federal courts treat § 1303 habeas petitions differently from § 2254
relief, then a new § 1303-specific habeas corpus jurisprudence
must be developed. Developing a new § 1303 habeas jurisprudence
will come at great cost to tribal governments that must defend
convictions in federal court. Both tribal court defendants, who
essentially must re-litigate habeas issues already settled in the state
241

U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2001).
Enas, 255 F.3d at 675 (“We conclude that Congress had the power to
determine that tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was inherent.
Therefore, acting under the 1990 amendments to the ICRA, the White Mountain
Apache Tribe prosecuted Enas pursuant to its own inherent power, and a federal
prosecution would proceed pursuant to a separate source of power.”). See also,
U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (affirming this same principle three years
after Enas).
243
Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 845.
242
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habeas review context, and Indian victims will relive the traumatic
experiences simply because the jurisprudence is unclear.
The legislative history of VAWA 2013 does focus on habeas
corpus under section 1303 of ICRA. The SCIA acknowledged that
“defendants typically would have a direct right to appeal to a tribal
appellate court,” and could file the writ of habeas in federal court
under ICRA, but “there would [] be no direct right of appeal to a
Federal court.”244 Despite this claim, the report then discusses that
the “purpose of the subsection on ‘Petitions to Stay Detention’ …
would clarify the current legal standards for determining whether a
person can be released from tribal detention prior to final
resolution of his habeas petition.”245 The ability of a federal court
to grant habeas relief to a petitioner without resolving their habeas
petition is essentially a direct appeal right, since it provides a
collateral attack on the tribal conviction without exhaustion of
tribal remedies. Congress explicitly debated the consequences of
creating a delegated authority with a direct appeal, or loosening
restrictions on inherent tribal authority and providing federal
habeas corpus review to tribal convictions. This clear legislative
history must be kept in mind when federal courts adjudicate ICRA
habeas petitions.
Alternatively, federal courts may apply already existing habeas
corpus jurisprudence to the §1303 habeas petitions, considering
National Farmers and its progeny. However, the legal mechanics
of applying existing federal habeas law to ICRA habeas review is
unclear. Federal courts could translate the constitutional rightsbased habeas corpus precedents to ICRA statutory habeas claims,
analogize any § 1303 habeas issues to relevant § 2254 sections, or
create an entirely new §1303 habeas jurisprudence that respects the
unique aspects of “domestic dependent nations.”246
Regardless of the approach the federal courts take, VAWA’s
stay of detention relief raises several important issues for the
collateral attack of tribal convictions. Judicially-created exceptions
to the tribal exhaustion rule in federal habeas relief offend tribal
244

SCIA, Stand Against Violence and Empower (SAVE) Native Women Act,
Senate Report 112-265 (December 27, 2012). The SAVE Act was the
predecessor legislative effort, eventually passing as part of the VAWA
amendments.
245
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246
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sovereignty and weaken tribal judicial institutions by eliminating
their appellate jurisdiction. Ultimately, this will deter tribal efforts
to implement VAWA, thereby to protect Native American women
and ultimately tribal communities.
A.

Tribal Exhaustion Under VAWA 2013

Because petitions must demonstrate a “substantial likelihood”
that they would be granted in order to receive immediate remedies,
to be excepted from the tribal exhaustion requirements a petitioner
must meet that standard. Under current Indian case law, a
petitioner would meet that standard by proving that any of the
National Farmers’ exceptions apply to his or her case. In defining
the “substantial likelihood” standard, the habeas court may apply
federal habeas corpus based on constitutional rights by analogy to
federal court decisions interpreting statutory §1303 habeas relief.
Alternatively, courts find that the quasi-constitutional rules
established by TLOA and VAWA require an entirely new federal
§1303 habeas jurisprudence. Either way, the federal courts must
establish guidelines for tribes in the federal habeas context. Absent
clear direction from the Supreme Court on applicable habeas
jurisprudence, tribal habeas relief will become an even more
confused morass of constitutional law, federal Indian law, and
federal court processes.
Left unresolved, §1303 relief will cause three main problems
for tribal courts. First, without specific guidance on ICRA habeas
jurisprudence, federal courts may offend and diminish tribal
sovereignty through misapplication of §1303 habeas jurisprudence.
Second, federal courts will create further confusion over the tribal
exhaustion requirement for all §1303 habeas petitioners—whether
Indian or non-Indian—regardless of the length of sentencing.
Third, absent guidance on the “substantial likelihood” standard for
immediate release, VAWA will have a chilling effect on the tribal
exercise of SDVCJ.
Without clear guidance from Congress and the federal courts,
the SDVCJ may create another layer of confusion in Indian law
jurisprudence, negating the real impact VAWA could have in
Indian country. First, disregard of the tribal exhaustion rule on
habeas review would create a lesser standard for collateral attacks
on tribal convictions than state court convictions. Although the
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Oliphant Court noted that state sovereigns are not equivalent to
tribes, which it called "quasi-sovereign entities,"247 this principle
has limited inherent tribal jurisdiction, not federal court
jurisdiction of review where tribes have personal and subject
matter jurisdiction. By providing a cause of action to stay tribal
detention even before the federal court has reached a final decision
on the habeas case, Congress gives much more deference to state
courts than tribal courts. By giving immediate habeas corpus
review to tribal petitioners and not state petitioners, Congress has
significantly weakened tribal courts. Congress is demanding that
tribes raise the level of legal practice in tribal courts through the
requirements of TLOA and VAWA, yet through §1303(e) it
simultaneously weakens the purview of tribal courts.
Second, §1303(e) contradicts the well-established National
Farmers doctrine of tribal exhaustion, which applies even in the
criminal conviction context.248 By providing an immediate stay of
detention provision, SDVCJ defendants may gain immediate
access to federal habeas review. This distinction between §1303
and §2254 habeas relief throws into doubt federal court §1303
habeas jurisprudence. The Second Circuit previously held §1303
habeas review to be equivalent in scope to its analogous state court
habeas corpus review statutes. 249 This framework would make
federal habeas jurisprudence applicable to §1303 petitions.
By explicitly including some constitutional protections into the
VAWA and TLOA statutes but not others, Congress has created
ambiguity in the applicable habeas corpus jurisprudence that
federal courts should use to review §1303 petitions. The rule
against surplusage 250 could make the inclusion of the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section jury requirement and indigent
defense counsel in Section 1304(d) redundant. Alternatively, the
ICRA can be read as highlighting these specific rights without
excluding “all other rights…necessary…for Congress to recognize

247

Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554
(1974)).
248
See infra, Section II.
249
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 880.
250
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
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and affirm”251 the tribe’s SDVCJ. Section 1303(e)’s exception to
the National Farmers, and habeas corpus exhaustion rule for
SDVCJ defendants, creates different avenues for collateral attacks
on tribal convictions depending on the subject matter of the
underlying charges involved. This is a fundamental difference
from §2254 collateral review, which requires exhaustion of state
appellate remedies and treats all petitions equally, regardless of the
underlying offense. The more differences between §1303 and other
statutory habeas review procedures there are, the more need for
federal courts to create new habeas jurisprudence and the less
certainty there is for participating tribes, as well as federal courts.
Rather than implementing a non-Indian exception similar to the
Ninth Circuit’s misguided Westsit progeny, the federal courts
should only create exceptions based upon similar principles found
in constitutional habeas corpus jurisprudence or analogous §2254
habeas decisions. For example, federal courts have permitted
habeas review where the tribe lacked explicit habeas corpus
provisions and only had informal procedures for seeking relief
through the tribal court. 252 For obvious violations of the
defendants’ rights such as this, the National Farmers exceptions
allow federal courts to provide a remedy without a harsh rule
exempting non-Indians from tribal appellate jurisdiction.
In Necklace v. Three Affiliated of Fort Berthold Reservation,
the Eighth Circuit reviewed an Indian petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus, which challenged a tribal involuntary commitment order to
a state hospital where she had been committed five years earlier.
The Eighth Circuit found that “because [tribal laws] contain no
formal habeas corpus procedure,” petitioner was not “required to
exhaust her tribal remedies.” Therefore, the court reversed the
lower court’s requirement for trial exhaustion.253 Given the lack of
any formal habeas corpus review process by the tribal court, this
decision both respects the National Farmers exhaustion rule and
conforms to similar treatment of state proceedings under §2254.254
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Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §
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Until Congress further develops ICRA habeas corpus
procedures, federal courts “should not address a petitioner's
unexhausted claims, unless the petitioner shows that one of the
doctrine's narrow exceptions applies.”255 Federal courts must look
to National Farmers and its progeny to permit §1303 petitioners
avoiding the tribal exhaustion requirements. While criminal
jurisdiction may be based on the Indian or non-Indian political
status of a defendant under Oliphant, federal courts should not
draw similar distinctions for habeas review.
Although federal courts may view Oliphant as establishing a
tribal exhaustion exception,256 the Court decided Oliphant before
announcing the National Farmers tribal exhaustion requirement in
1985. 257 Furthermore, the court strengthened the exhaustion
requirement in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante in 1987, holding
that “issue[s] of jurisdiction be resolved by the Tribal Courts in the
first instance” and that “local bias and incompetence” in tribal
courts don’t merit exceptions.”258
To fulfill Congress’s own policy of supporting tribal
sovereignty, courts should “preserve the ‘authority of the tribal
courts.’” 259 As Congress, guided by the Montana exceptions,
continues to dismantle further restraints on inherent tribal criminal
jurisdiction,260 federal courts must exercise restraint and deference
similar to that required under §2254 review. Until §1303 is further
developed by explicit legislation, federal courts should base §1303
decisions on the Indian canons of construction and habeas corpus
jurisprudence that is still applicable after the passage of the
AEDPA in 1996.
255

Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Selam v.
Warm Springs Tribal Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1988).
256
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Before judicially creating any further exceptions to National
Farmers exhaustive list, federal courts must “weigh[] the need to
preserve the cultural identity of the tribe by strengthening the
authority of the tribal courts, against the need to immediately
adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual rights.” 261 In
particular, federal habeas courts adopting the O’Neal balancing test
should update the factors in light of the purposes of VAWA’s Title
IX amendment. In addition to cultural needs, federal courts should
weigh the safety of the tribal community, federal inaction to
maintain a safe environment and the efforts of the tribe to ensure
the public safety of Indian country.
Third, the ICRA’s §1304(e) “substantial likelihood” standard
for §1303 SDVCJ habeas petitions is undefined in the
statute.262Because the stay of detention upon petition is a unique
remedy in federal habeas corpus law, a reviewing court will have
to interpret the standard based on other federal law. In state
collateral proceedings, §2254 requires “the applicant [to] exhaust[]
the remedies available in the courts of the State,” 263 unless no
“state corrective process is … available” or such process is
ineffective to protect the applicant. 264 Although §1303 does not
provide the same explicit comprehensive statutory framework for
collateral attacks on tribal convictions as §2254, the legislative
history of both statutes, congressional policy considerations in
Indian affairs and the Indian canons of construction265 result in at
least equivalent protections of sovereignty afforded to tribes as
states during federal habeas review.
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The Substantial Likelihood Standard

To define the “substantial likelihood” standard, a federal court
could look to several areas of law. Similar language is found in the
civil context of preliminary injunctions, which require “substantial
likelihood of success on the merits.”266 This gives no guidance or
controlling language to the ICRA habeas proceedings. A plain
language reading of §1304(e) may also lead the courts to the
United States Code Title 18’s release pending sentencing
provision. Although not mentioned in the legislative history, the
language and structure of Section 1304(e)(2)(A-B) tracks closely
the language of 18 U.S.C. §3143 “[r]elease or detention of a
defendant pending sentence or appeal.” That provision requires
that “a person who has been found guilty of an offense” be
detained prior to sentencing or upon appeal unless “there is a
substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will
be granted.” 267 In addition, the “judicial officer [must] find[] by
clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee
or pose a danger to any other person or the community.”268
Congress’s conception of ICRA habeas relief in terms of a presentencing or post-conviction release of federal defendants is both
problematic and emblematic of the long history of efforts to
federalize tribal laws. 269 However, by using language from
statutory provisions controlling post-conviction release for federal
defendants at the trial and direct appeal levels, Congress gives no
guidance to tribes and SDVCJ defendants seeking habeas review.
Because SDVCJ is inherent in tribal nations, judicial analysis of
the 18 U.S.C. §3143 post-conviction release language is only
relevant by analogy to ICRA habeas relief where the federal
government does not have jurisdiction over the defendant.
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Courts could also resolve the “substantial likelihood” standard
by looking empirically at the circumstances where federal courts
granted federal habeas corpus relief previously to §1303
petitioners. As the Garrow survey found, only four out of thirty
§1303 petitions resulted in habeas relief after exhaustion of tribal
remedies. 270 However, as the survey notes, Spears v. Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians 271 has since been discredited. 272
Moreover, new case law has affirmed that tribal courts have
jurisdiction over an elected official who sexually assaults a tribal
employee at the off-reservation tribal headquarters.273 Thus, basing
the likelihood on past ICRA habeas cases does not necessarily
incorporate the new expanses of tribal court jurisdiction.
In only one of the cases Professor Garrow surveyed was there a
true due process violation. In Wounded Knee v. Andera, the federal
habeas court granted relief for a defendant convicted at a
“considerably less than desirable” trial where the tribal judge’s
“dual role” as judge and prosecutor “necessarily violate[d] due
process.” 274 Though the tribe was “financially unable to hire a
prosecutor…financial obstacles” do not permit the tribe “to deny
persons liberties and rights secured by…ICRA.” 275 Despite this
basic violation of the fundamental impartiality of the judge, the
federal court still required exhaustion of tribal process.
In two of the cases, the tribal court misapplied fundamental
criminal procedure concepts. Johnson v. Tracy concerned a basic
misapplication of federal statutory law to a post-TLOA prosecution
of a crime occurring before TLOA’s passage. 276 The Arizona
District Court found that TLOA’s passage did not create
270
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retroactivity or ex post facto concerns because “as a general matter,
‘a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision.’” 277 Because the tribe convicted petitioner after the
passage of the TLOA on July 29, 2010, he “should have been
accorded the procedural protections of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) that
were then in effect as a result of the TLOA amendments.” 278
However, while the court vacated the verdict and unlawful
sentence, it emphasized that petitioner’s “new trial may again
result in petitioner's sentence for consecutive one-year sentences as
was permitted before the TLOA.”279
Although the Constitution does not apply to tribal
governments, the Garrow survey shows that only Wounded Knee
involved a true civil rights violation warranting the grant of a writ
of habeas corpus. In six other instances “petitioners raised various
challenges: equal protection and due process, that the trial judge
was improperly in office, the failure to prove Indian status, right to
counsel, the right to confrontation, right to compulsory process,
and right to a jury trial,” and all were denied habeas relief in
federal court.280 The Garrow survey shows that when correcting for
changes in the law and jurisdictional issues, the federal courts
rarely overturn tribal criminal convictions.
IV.CONCLUSION
Tribes are just beginning to convict defendants under VAWA
and TLOA in Indian country. The VAWA pilot program has been
very successful, with tribal SDVCJ charges resulting in eleven
being dismissed for jurisdictional or investigative reasons, ten
guilty pleas, five referrals for federal prosecution, and one acquittal
by a jury. 281 The participating tribes exercising SDVCJ after the
pilot program have had similar results. 282 So far, no ICRA
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defendants have sought collateral review of SDVCJ convictions in
federal court.283 However, as tribal participation grows and more
charges are brought against non-Indians, and tribal courts
implement enhanced TLOA sentencing, more habeas challenges
will be brought before the federal courts.
The discussion for tribes is already shifting to concerns over
§1303 habeas relief,284 which will affect not only SDVCJ but any
further sentencing or legislative Oliphant exceptions in the future.
Congress and individual tribes have invested great amounts of
resources into these Indian country safety efforts. Federal courts
should weigh §1303 petitions with that consideration in mind as
they resolve the many issues left unresolved by the court’s habeas
jurisprudence.
Congress has breathed new life into tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination in the criminal context through its first partial
Oliphant-fix. However, tribes must bear in mind that ICRA’s
habeas relief gives federal courts access to their legislative and
cultural purview in ways they have not experienced since Santa
Clara. Tribes must be ready and able to defend their convictions
on federal collateral review, while also maintaining the cultural
integrity of their tribal courts. Otherwise, VAWA’s SDVCJ will
eventually create the system that Senator Sam Ervin originally
conceived of, where ICRA would provide a vehicle for further
assimilation of tribes.285
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